

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SANAA 00750 01 OF 02 021423 Z

44

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

----- 085573

R 021315 Z MAY 73

FM AMEMBASSY SANAA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2073

INFO AMEMBKESY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

CINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SANAA 750

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR YE, YS, SA

SUBJ: ACTIVITIES OF SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR

REX: (A) SANAA 725 (NOTAL); SANAA 729 (NOTAL)

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

NOFORN EXCEPT UK

SUMMARY: SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR SUDAIRY IS TAKING
SOME DANGEROUS NEW DIRECTIONS IN HIS HEAVY- HANDED EFFORTS
INFLUENCE YAR POLICY AND LEADERSHIP. END SUMMARY.

1. AHMAD ABDU SA' ID, MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEVELOPMENT WHO
SITTING IN FOR PRIMIN AL- HAJRI, ASKED ME TO CALL MAY 1
FOR REVIEW OF CONVERSATION HE HAD HELD PREVIOUS DAY
WITH SAUDI AMBASSADOR SUDAIRY. SEVERAL ELEMENTS IN
THIS CONVERSATION WERE DISTURBING TO YARG, INDICATING
CONTINUING MISUNDERSTANDING OF YARG' S INTERNAL CIR-
CUMSTANCES AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY INPERATIVES.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SANAA 00750 01 OF 02 021423 Z

2. ACCORDING SA' ID, SUDAIRY PROVIDED WELCOME NEWS THAT SPECIAL PLANE CARRYING SAUDI GENERAL KABBANI AND PARTY OF APPROXIMATELY 15 OFFICERS WOULD BE ARRIVING SANAA MORNING MAY 2 FOR THOROUGH REVIEW OF BOTH SHORT AND LONG TERM YAR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. AFTER CONVEYING THIS INFORMATION, SUDAIRY LAUNCHED LONG HARANGUE ABOUT DEFICIENCIES IN YARG POLICIES AND LEADERSHIP. HE SAID THAT FOR ITS PART SAG WILLING AND READY MOVE DECISIVELY TO HELP ITS SOUTHERN NEIGHBOR. HOWEVER, HE FOUND YARG LEADERSHIP, PARTICULARLY PRESIDENT AL-IRYANI, DISORGANIZED AND APPARENTLY UNWILLING TO ACT ON ASSURANCES MADE IN RIYADH IN MARCH THAT YAR WISHES NECESSARILY A VIOLATION OF THE SINGLE CONVENTION, HAS BEEN ROUNDLY CONDEMNED BY VIRTUALLY ALL GOVERNMENTS AND AGENCIES WORKING IN THE NARCOTICS FIELD, INCLUDING THE U. S. OBTAINING THE BUREAUCRATIC APPROVAL TO MOVE AHEAD WITH A PRE-EMPTIVE PURCHASE WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT IN THE FACE OF THESE FORMIDABLE ADVERSARIES TO THE IDEA.

4. QUOTE - ROLPH, HOWEVER, HAS A NUMBER OF GOOD POINTS. ENFORCEMENT STOPS, AT A ROUGH ESTIMATE, 10-20 PERCENT OF ALL ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN A GOOD YEAR. THE INCREASE IN ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS WILL NEVER BE SUFFICIENT TO HALT THE MAJORITY OF OPIATES LEAVING THE AREA INTO THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET. THE CROP SUBSTITUTION EFFORT HAS BARELY GOTTEN UNDERWAY IN THAILAND AND LAOS, AND IS VERY LIMITED IN BURMA, WHERE A MAJOR PART OF THE EFFORT WOULD BE CONCENTRATED. PRE-EMPTIVE BUYING, BECAUSE IT INITIALLY INVOLVES THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF DISLOCATION AT THE GROWING AREAS, WOULD HIT DIRECTLY AT THE PROBLEM WITHOUT CAUSING HARDSHIP TO THE FARMERS, WHO BENEFIT RELATIVELY LITTLE FROM THE OPIUM TRADE. THERE IS ALSO THE REAL POSSIBILITY THAT THERE ARE BASIC LIMITATIONS ON THE AMOUNT OF OPIUM WHICH CAN BE PRODUCED IN THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE AREA WHICH COULD PLACE TOTAL PRODUCTION WITHIN THE REALM OF POSSIBILITY FOR SOME FORM OF PRE-EMPTIVE PURCHASE.

5. QUOTE - AT THE JANUARY 1973 WHOLESALE PRICE IN TACHILEK FOR RAW OPIUM OF APPROXIMATELY \$20 PER KILO, THE ESTIMATED 700 TONS OF RAW OPIUM PRODUCED ANNUALLY IN THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE AREA FOR THE ILLICIT MARKET WOULD COST \$14 MILLION. THE ADDED COST OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR THE CROP, AS WELL AS THE INCREASE IN SUPPLY EITHER DUE TO INCREASED PLANNING OR DIVERSION FROM LOCAL USE THAT WOULD RESULT FROM "PRIMING THE PUMP" IN THIS MANNER, WOULD COST AT THE MOST AN ADDITIONAL \$6 MILLION, FOR A TOTAL OF \$20 MILLION PER YEAR. THIS WOULD BE THE COST OF REMOVING FROM THE WORLD MARKET MOST OF THE OPIUM NOW COMING FROM THE WORLD'S LARGEST SOURCE OF ILLICIT OPIUM.

6. QUOTE - THE CASE AGAINST PRE-EMPTIVE BUYS, THOUGH, IS A STRONG ONE. A PRE-EMPTIVE BUY WILL ONLY WORK WHERE THERE IS REASONABLE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTROL OVER AN AREA, TO PROHIBIT UNCONTROLLED TRADING FROM CONTINUING. IN AN AREA LIKE THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE, WHERE THERE IS NO CONTROL OVER THE PRIME PRODUCING AREAS EAST OF THE SALWEEN, THERE IS VERY LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT ALL OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENTI 03356 021442 Z

AVAILABLE OPIUM WILL BE BROUGHT IN TO BE TURNED OVER TO GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES. SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF OPIUM WILL STILL FIND ITS WAY OUT THE BACK DOOR TO THE ILLICIT MARKET, WHERE PRICES WILL NO DOUBT BE MORE ATTRACTIVE. THE HEAVY DEMAND THAT NOW EXISTS IN THE OVERSEAS MARKETS WOULD TEND TO DRIVE UP THE PRE- EMPTIVE BUYING PRICE AS LONG AS THE ILLICIT DEMAND IS UNSATISFIED. UNLESS THE BUY IS CONDUCTED WITH OFFICIALS TRAVELLING FROM FARM TO FARM TO ACQUIRE THE OPIUM HARVEST, WE CAN EXPECT A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT TO BE DIVERTED FROM THE OFFICIAL SUPPLY.

7. QUOTE- ANOTHER SERIOUS CONSEQUENCE OF A PRE- EMPTIVE BUY IS THE EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE ON THE ARMS FOR OPIUM TRADE. MUCH OF THE OPIUM NOW BEING TRAFFICKED IN BURMA IS TRADED FOR BARTER AND NOT CASH, THE PRIMARY BARTER ITEMS BEING BLACK MARKET GOODS AND ARMS. PRE- EMPTIVE BUYING WOULD ASSURE A READY SUPPLY OF CASH OR CREDIT FOR PURCHASES OR TO FINANCE LOCAL INSURGENCIES, MAKING IT AN IMPOSSIBLE PROPOSITION FROM THE BURMESE POINT OF VIEW.

8. QUOTE - A PRE- EMPTIVE BUY WILL ONLY WORK IN THE BEST OF CONDITIONS, WHERE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE FORMULA CAN BE CONTROLLED TO A REASONABLE EXTENT. WE WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM TO EVEN SUGGEST THAT A PRE- EMPTIVE PURCHASE OF OPIUM WOULD WORK IN A SITUATION AS POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY AND MILITARILY UNSTABLE AS EXISTS IN THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE.

9. QUOTE - FINALLY, THE MOST TELLING ARGUMENT AGAINST A PRE- EMPTIVE BUY THAT IS FOCUSED ON SOUTHEAST ASIA IS THAT, EVEN IF IT TEMPORARILY TAKES OFF THE ILLICIT MARKET A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF OPIATES, OTHER OPIUM PRODUCING AREAS OF THE WORLD ARE STILL READY SUPPLIERS, AND PERHAPS NEW PRODUCTION AREAS WILL COME INTO BEING TO FILL THE VACUUM. UNLESS THE U. S. AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS ARE WILLING TO SPEND VASTLY GREATER SUMS THAN DISCUSSED HEREIN TO CONDUCT PRE- EMPTIVE PURCHASES AROUND THE WORLD, THE ONLY RESULT WILL BE THAT THE SCENE OF OPIUM PRODUCTION WILL TEMPORARILY SHIFT TO OTHER LOCATIONS. THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE CANNOT BE TREATED IN ISOLATION -- ONE LESSON WE HAVE LEARNED THUS FAR IS THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF NARCOTICS PROBLEMS IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD, AND TO IGNORE THIS BASIC FACT WOULD BE A STEP BACKWARD FOR ALL CONCERNED.

10. QUOTE - OUR CONCLUSION THEN IS THAT GIVEN THE EXISTING STATE OF AFFAIRS IN BURMA, A PRE- EMPTIVE BUY IS NOT FEASIBLE. FURTHER, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VIENTI 03356 021442 Z

EVEN IF THE SITUATION CLEARS UP AT LEAST TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO PERMIT A GREATER DEGREE OF THAI- BURMESE COOPERATION, WE THINK THE EXISTING FOCUS ON ENFORCEMENT AND CROP SUBSTITUTION, HOWEVER IMPER- FECT, IS STILL PREFERABLE TO VENTURING TO PRE- EMPTIVE BUYING. UNQUOTE- END OF TEXT OF PAPER. DEAN

CONFIDENTIAL
NMAFVVZCZ

ADP000
SECRET

PAGE 01 SANAA 00750 02 OF 02 021430 Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
----- 085624

R 021315 Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2074
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
CINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SANAA 750

EXDIS

AHEAD, IT HAD BETTER HAVE AL- HAJRI OR ANOTHER OF SAG' S FRIENDS IN YARG CALLIN SUDAIRY AND EXPLAIN RATIONALE. ALTERNATIVELY, YARG MIGHT DO WELL TO CON- sider POSTPONING VISIT SINCE ITS COINCIDENTAL CONJUC- tion WITH KABBANI VISIT HERE LIKELY AND BE MISREAD BY SAG AS DELIBERATE AFFRONT.

9. COMMENT: BELIEVE THERE IS A FAIR CHANCE YARG MAY DECIDE RECONSIDER ADVISABILITY OF HAVING CIC VISIT MOSCOW AT THIS TIME. CANCELLATION WOULD BE CONSTRUED BY SOVIETS AS A SLAP IN FACE BUT COULD BE JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF HEALTH SINCE AL- IRYANI IS INDEED SUFFERING FROM MILD ATTACK OF ARTHRITIS.

10. SUDAIRY' S BACKING FOR RETURN OF AL- AMRI AND REPLACEMENT OF AL- HAJRI, WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN SAG' S CHOSD INSTRUMENT, AND AL' AKWA IS A POTENTIALLY

SIGNIFICANT AND DANGEROUS DEPARTURE. EVER SINCE HIS INSTALLATION AS PRIME MINISTER IN DECEMBER 1972, AL- HAJRI HAS COME IN FOR CRITICISM ON GROUNDS OF BEING A SAUDI PUPPET. LEFTISTS AND MANY WHO VIEW THEMSELVES AS PROGRESSIVES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AGAINST HIM. HIS GRASP OF GOVERNMENT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SANAA 00750 02 OF 02 021430 Z

AFFAIRS HAS NOT IMPROVED WITH TENURE IN OFFICE AND, ALTHOUGH A MAN OF VERY FIRM OPINIONS, AND STRONG WILL, HIS LEADERSHIP HAS NOT PROVED GENUINELY EFFECTIVE OR DECISIVE. CURRENTS DECISION- MAKING HAVE TENDED BYPASS HIM WITH YARG POLICIES BEING MADE BY INTERACTION OF PRESIDENT, DEPU MFPRIMIN/ FONMIN NU' MAN, SA' ID, ECONOMIC MINISTER AL- ASREAU FROM SALES PROCEEDS.) BAL- ANCE OF \$41,954 OF OUR TOTAL REQUEST FOR \$59,954 CAN BE PROVIDED AFTER THE BUDGET CONFERENCES.

4. POST CONTINUING TO SEEK WAYS TO MANAGE WITHIN CURRENT OPERATING ALLOWANCE. HOWEVER, UNLESS SOME FUNDS ARE

RECEIVED IMMEDIATELY, DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW POST WILL BE ABLE CARRY ON NORMAL FULL TIME ACTIVITIES WITH REGULAR COMPLEMENT.

5. ADVISE URGENTLY.

TODMAN

UNCLASSIFIED

NMAFVVZCZ

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

*** Current Classification *** SECRET

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PFOR YE
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 MAY 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: morefirh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SANAA00750
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: SANAA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730533/aaaahiiq.tel
Line Count: 255
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: morefirh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 02 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02-Aug-2001 by shawdg>; APPROVED <21 FEB 2002 by morefirh>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> mcm 971113
Subject: ACTIVITIES OF SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR
TAGS: PFOR, SA, YS
To: ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBKESY AMMAN
CINCEUR
JIDDA
KUWAIT
LONDON
SECSTATE WASHDC

SS

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005